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What is Literacy? 
by 
James Paul Gee 
It is a piece of folk wisdom that part of what 
linguists do is define words. In over a decade as a 
linguist, however, no one, until now, has asked me to 
define a word . So my first try: what does "literacy" 
mean? It won't surprise you that we have to define 
some other words first. So let me begin by giving a 
technical meaning to an old term which, unfortunately, 
already has a variety of other meanings. The term is 
"discourse." I will use the word as a count term ("a 
discourse," "discourses," "many di scourses"), not as a 
mass term ("discourse," "much discourse"). By "a 
discourse" I will mean: 
a soaia lly aaaepted assoaiation among ways o f 
using language, of thinking, and o f aating that 
aan be used to identify onesel f a s a member of 
a soaially meaning ful group or "soaial network ." 
Think of discourse as an "identity kit" which comes 
complete with the appropriate costume and instructions 
on how to act and talk so as to take on a parti cular 
role that others will recognize. Let me give an 
example: Being "trained" as a linguist meant that I 
learned to speak, think and act like a linguist, and 
to recogni ze others when they do so. Now actually 
matters are not that simple: the larger discourse of 
linguistics contains many subdiscourses, different 
socially accepted ways of being a linguist. But the 
master discourse is not just the sum of its parts, it 
is something also over and above them. Every act of 
speaking, writing and behaving a linguist does as a 
lingui st is meaningful only against the background of 
the whole socia l institution of linguistics, and that 
institution is made up of concrete things like people, 
books and build i ngs; abstract things like bodies of 
knowledge, values, norms and beliefs; mixtures of 
concrete and abstract things like universities, journals 
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and publishers; as well as a shared history and shared 
stories. Some other examples of discourses: being an 
American or a Russian, being a man or a woman, being a 
member of a certain socio-economic class, being a fac-
tory worker or a boardroom executive, being a doctor or 
a hospital patient, being a teacher, an administrator, 
or a student, being a member of a sewing circle, a club, 
a street gang, a lunchtime social gathering, or a regu-
lar at a local watering hole. 
There are a number of important points that one can 
make about discourses, none of which, for some reason, 
are very popular to Americans, though they seem to be 
commonplace in European social theory (Belsey, 1980; 
Eagleton, 1983; Jameson, 1981; Macdonell, 1986; 
Thompson, 1984): 
1. Discourses are inherently "ideological." They 
crucially involve a set of values and viewpoints in 
terms of which one must speak and act, at least while 
being in the discourse; otherwise one doesn't count as 
being in it. 
2. Discourses are resistant to internal criticism 
and self-scrutiny since uttering viewpoints that seri-
ously undermine them defines one as being outside them. 
The discourse itself defines what counts as acceptable 
criticism. Of course, one can criticize a particular 
discourse from the viewpoint of another one (e.g., 
psychology criticizing linguistics). But what one 
cannot do is stand outside all discourse and criticize 
any one or all of them--that would be like trying to 
repair a jet in flight by stepping outside it. 
3. Discourse-defined positions from which to 
speak and behave are not, however, just defined internal 
to a discourse, but also as standpoints taken up by the 
discourse in its relation to other, ultimately opposing, 
discourses. The discourse of managers in an industry 
is partly defined as a set of views, norms and stand-
points defined by their opposition to analogous points 
in the discourse of workers (Macdonell, 1986: 1-7). 
The discourse we identify with being a feminist is 
radically changed if all male discourses disappear. 
4. Any discourse concerns itself with certain 
objects and puts forward certain concepts, viewpoints 
and values at the expense of others. In doing so it 
will marginalize viewpoints and values central to other 
discourses (Macdonell, 1986: 1-7). In fact, a discourse 
can call for one to accept values in conflict with other 
discourses one is a member of--for example, the dis-
course used in literature departments used to marginal-
ize popular literature and women's writings. Further, 
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women readers of Hemingway, for instance, when acting as "acceptable readers" by 
the standards of the discourse of literary criticism~ might find themselves 
complicit with values which conflict with those of various other discourses they 
belong to as women (Culler, 1982: 43-64). 
5. Finally, discourses are intimately related to the distribution of social 
power and hierarchical structure in society. Control over certain discourses can 
lead to the acquisition of social goods (money, power, status) in a society. 
These discourses empower those groups who have the least conflicts with their 
other discourses when they use them. For example, many academic, legalistic and 
bureaucratic discourses in our society contain a moral subdiscourse that sees 
"right" as what is derivable from general abstract principles. This can conflict 
to a degree with a discourse about morality that appears to be more often associ-
ated with women than men in terms of which "wrong" is seen as the disruption of 
social networks, and "right" as the repair of those networks (Gilligan, 1982). 
Or, to take another example, the discourse of literary criticism was a standard 
route to success as a professor of literature. Since it conflicted less with 
the other discourses of white, middle class men than it did with those of women, 
men were empowered by it. Women were not, as they were often at cross-purposes 
when engaging in it. Let us call discourses that lead to social goods in a 
society "dominant discourses" and let us refer to those groups that have the 
fewest conflicts when using them as "dominant groups." Obviously these are both 
matters of degree and change to a certain extent in different contexts. 
It is sometimes helpful to say that it is not individuals who speak and 
act, but rather historically and socially defined discourses speak to each other 
through individuals. The individual instantiates, gives body to, a discourse 
every time he acts or speaks and thus carries it, and ultimately changes it, 
through time. Americans tend to be very focused on the individual, and thus 
often miss the fact that the individual is simply the meeting point of many, 
sometimes conflicting, socially and historically defined discourses. 
The crucial question is: how does one come by the discourses that he 
controls? And here it is necessary, before answering the question, to make an 
important distinction, a distinction that does not exist in non-technical par-
lance, but one which is important to a linguist: a distinction between 
"acquisition" and "learning" (Krashen, 1982, 1985; Kras hen & Terrell, 1983). I 
will distinguish these two as follows: 
Acquisition is a process of acquiring something subconsciously by exposure 
to models and a process of trial and error, without a process of formal 
teaching . It happens in natural settings which are meaningful and func-
tional in the sense that the acquirer knows that he needs to acquire the 
thing he is exposed to in order to function and the acquirer in fact wants 
to so function. This is how most people come to control their first 
language . 
Learning is a process that involves conscious knowledge gained through 
teaching, though not necessarily from someone officially designated a 
teacher. This teaching involves explanation and analysis , that is, 
breaking down the thing to be learned into its analytic parts. It 
inherently involves attaining, along with the matter being taught, some 
degree of meta-knowledge about the matter. 
s 
Much of what we come by in life, after our initial enculturation, involves 
a mixture of acquisition and learning. However, the balance between the two can 
be quite different in different cases and different at different stages in the 
process. For instance, I initially learned to drive a car by instruction, but 
thereafter acquired, rather than learned, most of what I know. Some cultures 
highly value acquisition and so tend simply to expose children to adults modeling 
some activity and eventually the child picks it up, picks it up as a gestalt, 
rather than as a series of analytic bits (Scollon & Scollon, 1981; Heath, 1983). 
Other cultural groups highly value teaching and thus break down what is to be 
mastered into sequential steps and analytic parts and engage in explicit explana-
tion. There is an up side and a down side to both that can be expressed as 
follows: "we are better at what we acquire, but we consciously know more about 
what we have learned." For most of us, playing a musical instrument, or dancing, 
or using a second language are skills we attained by some mixture of acquisition 
and learning. But it is a safe bet that, over the same amount of time, people 
are better at these activities if acquisition predominated during that time . 
The point can be made using second language as the example: most people aren't 
very good at attaining a second language in any very functional way through 
formal instruction in a classroom. That's why teaching grammar is not a very 
good way of getting people to control a language. However, people who have 
acquired a second language in a natural setting don't thereby make good linguists, 
and some good linguists can't speak the languages they learned in a classroom. 
What is said here about second languages is true, I believe, of all of what I 
will later refer to as "secondary discourses": acquisition is good for perform-
ance, learning is good for meta-level knowledge (cf. Scribner & Cole, 1981). 
Acquisition and learning are thus, too, differential sources of power: acquirers 
usually beat learners at performance, learners usually beat acquirers at talking 
about it, that is, at explication, explanation, analysis and criticism. 
Now what has this got to do with literacy? First, let me point out that it 
renders the common sense understanding of literacy very problematic. Take the 
notion of a "reading class." I don't know if they are still prevalent, but when 
I was in grammar school we had a special time set aside each day for "reading 
class" where we would learn to read. Reading is at the very least the ability 
to interpret print (surely not just the ability to call out the names of letters), 
but an interpretation of print is just a viewpoint on a set of symbols, and view-
points are always enbedded in a discourse. Thus, while many different discourses 
use reading, even in opposing ways, and while there could well be classes 
devoted to these discourses, reading outside such a discourse or class would be 
truly "in a vacuum," much like our repairman above trying to repair the jet in 
flight by jumping out the door. Learning to read is always learning some aspect 
of some discourse. One can trivialize this insight to a certain degree by 
trivializing the notion of interpretation (of printed words), until one gets to 
reading as calling out the names of letters. Analogously, one can deepen the 
insight by taking successively deeper views of what interpretation means. But, 
there is also the problem with "reading class" that it stresses learning and not 
acquisition. To the extent that reading as both decoding and interpretation is 
a performance, learning stresses the production of poor performers. If we wanted 
to stress acquisition we would have to expose children to reading and this would 
always be to expose them to a discourse whose name would never be "Reading" (at 
least until the student went to the university and earned a degree called 
"Reading"). To the extent that it is important to have meta-level skills in 
regard to language, reading class as a place of learning rather than of acquisi-
tion might facilitate this, but is is arguable that a reading class would hardly 
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be the best place to do this. While reading classes like mine might not be 
around any more, it encapsulated the common sense notion of literacy as "the 
ability to read and write" (intransitively), a notion that is nowhere near as 
coherent as it at first sounds. 
Now I will approach a more positive connection between a viable notion of 
literacy and the concepts we have dealt with above. All humans, barring serious 
disorder, get one form of discourse free, so to speak, and this through acquisi-
tion. This is our socio-culturally determined ways of using our native language 
in face-to-face communication with intimates (intimates are people with whom we 
share a great deal of knowledge because of a great deal of contact and similar 
experiences). This is sometimes referred to as "the oral mode" (Gee, 1986b)--it 
is the birth right of every human and comes through the process of primary 
socialization within the family as this is defined within a given culture. Some 
small, so-called "primitive," cultures function almost like extended families 
(though never completely so) in that this type of discourse is usable in a very 
wide array of social contacts. This is due to the fact that these cultures are 
small enough to function as a "society of intimates" (Givon, 1979). In modern 
technological and urban societies which function as a "society of strangers," 
the oral mode is more narrowly useful. Let us refer then to this oral mode, 
developed in the primary process of enculturation, as the "primary discourse." 
It is important to realize that even among speakers of English there are socio-
culturally different primary discourses. For example, lower socio-economic black 
children use English to make sense of their experience differently than do middle 
class children; they have a different primary discourse (Gee, 1985; 1986a; 
Michaels, 1981; 1985). And this is not due merely to the fact that they have a 
different dialect of English. So-called "Black Vernacular English" is, on 
structural grounds, only trivially different from standard English by the norms 
of linguists accustomed to dialect differences around the world (Labov, 1972). 
Rather, these children use language, behavior, values and beliefs to give a 
different shape to their experience. 
Beyond the primary discourse, however, are other discourses which crucially 
involve social institutions beyond the family (or the primary socialization 
group as defined by the culture), no matter how much they also involve the fam-
ily. These institutions all share the factor that they require one to communi-
cate with non-intimates (or to treat intimates as if they were not intimates). 
Let us refer to these as "secondary institutions" (such as schools, workplaces, 
stores, government offices, businesses, churches, etc.). Discourses beyond the 
primary discourse are developed in association with and by having access to and 
practice with these secondary institutions. Thus, we will refer to them as 
"secondary discourses." These secondary discourses all build on, and extend, 
the uses of language we acquired as part of our primary discourse, and they be 
more or less compatible with the primary discourses of different social groups. 
It is, of course, a great advantage when the secondary discourse is compatible 
with your primary one. But all these secondary discourses involve uses of lan-
guage, either written or oral, or both, that go beyond our primary discourse no 
matter what group we belong to. Let's call those uses of language in secondary 
discourses which go beyond the uses of language stemming from our primary 
discourse "secondary uses of language." Telling your mother you love her is a 
primary use of language, telling your teacher you don't have your homework is a 
secondary use. It can be noted, however, that sometimes people must fall back 
on their primary uses of language in inappropriate circumstances when they fail 
to control the requisite secondary use. 
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Now we can get to what I believe is a useful definition of literacy: 
literacy is contPol of secondaPy uses o f language (i . e ., uses of language 
in secondaPy discoupses) 
Thus, there are as many applications of the word "literacy" as there are secon-
dary discourses, which is many. We can define various types of literacy as 
follows: 
dominant literacy is contPol of a secondaPy use o f language used in what 
I called above a "dominant dis couPse " 
powePful litePacy is contPol o f a secondaPy use of language used in a 
secondaPy discouPse that can sePve as a meta- discoupse to cPitique the 
pPimaPy discoupse OP otheP secondaPy discoupses , including dominant 
discouPses 
What do I mean by "control" in the above definitions? 
being able to "use," to "function" with, so "control" 
"Mastery" I define as "full and effortless control." 
state a principle having to do with acquisition which 
I mean some degree of 
is a matter of degree. 
In these terms I wi ll 
I believe is true: 
Any discoupse (pPimaPy OP secondaPy) is foP most people most of the time 
only mastePed thPough acquisition, not leaPning . Thus , litePacy is mastePed 
thPough acquisition, not leaPning, that is , it PequiPes exposupe to models 
in natuPal , meaningful , and functional settings, and teaching is not liable 
to be vePy successful--it may even initially get in the way . Time spent on 
leaPning and not acquisition is time not well spent if the goal i s mas tePy 
in pePf oPmance . 
There is also a pri nciple having to do with learning that I think true: 
One cannot cPitique one discouPse with anotheP one (which is the only way 
to sePiously cPiticize and thus change a discouPse ) unless one has meta-
level knowledge in both discouPses . And this meta- knowledge is best 
developed thPough leaPning, though often leaPning applied to a discouPse 
one has to a cePtain extent alPeady acquiPed. Thus , powePful litePacy , as 
defined above , almost always involves leaPning, and not just acquisition . 
The point i s that acqui sition and learni ng are means to quite different goals, 
though i n our culture we very often confuse these means and thus don't get what 
we thought and hoped we would. 
Let me just briefly mention some practical connections of the above remarks. 
Mainstream middl e class children often look like they are learning literacy (of 
various sorts} in school. But, in fact, I believe much research shows they are 
acqui r i ng these literacies through experiences in the home both before and during 
school, as well as by the opportunities school gives them to practice what they 
are acquiring (Wells, 1985; 1986a, b}. The learning they are doing, provided it 
is tied to good teaching, is giving them not the literacies, but meta-level 
cognitive and linguistic skills that they can use to critique various discourses 
throughout their lives. However, we all know that teaching is not by any means 
always that good--though it should be one of our goals to see to it that it is. 
Children from non-mainstream homes often do not get the opportunities to acquire 
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dominant secondary discourses, for example those connected with the school, prior 
to school in their homes, due to the lack of access their parents have to these 
secondary discourses. Thus, when coming to school they cannot practice what they 
haven't yet got and they are exposed mostly to a process of learning and not 
acquisition. Since little acquisition thereby goes on, they often cannot use 
this learning-teaching to develop meta-level skills since this requires some 
degree of acquisition of secondary discourses to use in the critical process. 
Further, research pretty clearly shows that many school-based secondary discourses 
conflict with the values and viewpoints in some non-mainstream children's primary 
discourses and other community-based secondary discourses (e.g., stemming from 
religious institutions) (Heath, 1983; Cook-Gumperz, 1986; Gumperz, 1982). 
While the above remarks may all seem rather theoretical, they do in fact 
lead to some obvious practical suggestions for directions future research and 
intervention efforts ought to take. As far as I can see some of these are as 
follows: 
1. Settings which focus on acquisition, not learning, should be stressed 
if the goal is to help non-mainstream children attain mastery of literacies. 
This is certainly not liable to be a traditional classroom setting (let alone my 
"reading class"), but rather natural and functional environments, which may or 
may not happen to be inside a school. 
2. We should realize that teaching and learning are connected with the 
development of meta-level cognitive and linguistic skills. They will work better 
if we explicitly realize this and build this realization into our curricula. 
Further, they must be ordered and integrated with acquisition in viable ways if 
they are to have any effect other than obstruction. 
3. Mainstream children are actually using much of the teaching-learning 
they get not to learn but to acquire, by practicing developing skills. We 
should thus honor this practice effect directly and build on it, rather than 
leave it as a surreptitious and indirect by-product of teaching-learning. 
4. Learning should lead to the ability for all children--mainstream and 
non-mainstream--to critique their primary discourses and secondary discourses, 
including dominant secondary discourses. This requires exposing children to a 
variety of alternative primary discourses and secondary ones (not necessarily so 
that they acquire them, but so that they learn about them). It also requires 
realizing explicitly that this is what good teaching and learning is good at. 
We rarely realize that this is where we fail mainstream children just as much as 
non-mainstream ones. 
S. We must take seriously that no matter how good our schools become, both 
as environments where acquisition can go on (so involving meaningful and func-
tional settings) and where learning can go on, the non-mainstream child will 
always have more conflicts in using and thus mastering dominant secondary 
discourses, since they conflict more seriously with his primary discourse and 
community-based secondary ones. This is precisely what it means (by my defini-
tions above) to be "non-mainstream." This does not mean we should give up. It 
also does not mean merely that research and intervention efforts must have 
sensitivity to these conflicts built into them, though it certainly does mean 
this. It also requires, I believe, that we must also stress research and inter-
vention efforts that facilitate the developmen~ of wider and more humane concepts 
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of mastery and its connections to gate-keeping. We must remember that conflicts, 
while they do very often detract from standard sorts of full mastery, can give 
rise to new sorts of mastery. This is commonplace in the realm of art. We must 
make it commonplace in society at large. 
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